By Olga Oliker, Christopher S. Chivvis, Keith Crane, Olesya Tkacheva, Scott Boston
RAND - 2015
This Perspective provides an overview and analysis of sources of Russian
foreign policy to help explain Russia's actions in Ukraine in 2014 and
2015. It evaluates arguments based on Russian historical strategic
interests, economic policy, and domestic policy to determine which
explanations, alone or in combination, stand up best to Russia's actual
choices and actions. The authors conclude that Russia's general attitude
toward Ukraine is largely consistent with historical Russian (and
Soviet) thinking about security interests and foreign policy, which have
focused on buffer states, influence on its neighbors, and a perception
of continued competition with the United States. However, these
historical patterns alone are insufficient to fully explain Russian
actions. Neither can public opinion, elite interests, or the pursuit of
economic growth be defined as key drivers of Russian behavior. Moscow
has sought to shape, rather than respond to, public opinion, and has
done so with great success. Decisionmaking in the Kremlin has become
highly centralized, obviating the possibility of elite group influence.
Finally, economic growth goals have been jettisoned, rather than
pursued, in this crisis. This said, the authors argue that an important
component of the Kremlin's decision calculus also stems from how
Russia's leaders, particularly Russian President Vladimir Putin, have
interpreted the implications of the Maidan uprising in Ukraine for their
own country. As a result, Putin's fear that popular opposition and
unrest will threaten his power has led him to endanger many of the
things he has worked to build over his tenure.
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