Revising the Future of Flight
Foreign Affairs - December 18, 2013
The United States needs air power, but it does not need an air force.
In fact, it never really did. The U.S. Air Force, founded in 1947,
was the product of a decades-long campaign by aviation enthusiasts
inside the U.S. Army. These advocates argued that air power could not
achieve its promise under the leadership of ground commanders. With
memories of the great bombing campaigns of World War II still fresh and a
possible confrontation with the Soviets looming, the nation’s would-be
cold warriors determined that the age of air power was upon them. But it
wasn’t. Advocates of an independent air force had misinterpreted the
lessons of World War II to draw faulty conclusions about air power’s
future.
Their mistake produced a myriad of problems. Modern warfare almost
invariably demands close cooperation across air and surface units. In
naval operations, all of these assets -- submarines, surface ships, and
aircraft -- belong to the same service. In the case of the army and the
air force, however, the component parts end up being divided -- or
needlessly replicated -- by separate bureaucratic organizations, each
with its own priorities. As a result, the services tend to plan
operations and procure equipment based on their own needs rather than
those of the military as a whole. When they ask lawmakers for funding,
moreover, they tend to concentrate on missions that they believe they
can accomplish on their own. Finally, during wars, the services often
struggle to cooperate by scaling the bureaucratic walls they constructed
in peacetime.
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